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11

OBJECTION TO APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellee, Richard Gardiner, objects to the Appellant's
Statement of Facts in that the Appellant has not provided any
citation to the record supporting the alleged facts. Furthermore,
the Appellee provides herein a statement of facts which accurately
reflects the evidence presented to the Court. The Appellee further
objects to any Appellant's alleged facts which contradict the
Appellee's Statement of Facts found herein.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Gardiner filed a Complaint for judgment

(in the form of a

Warrant in Debt) against Interport, Inc. ("Interport") in the
General District Court of Fairfax County, Virginia. See Record, p.
217, para. 1.

The Warrant in Debt was mailed to the Interport's

registered agent on August

2, 2000 and was received on August 5,

2000. Record, p. 217, para. 1.
Interport's registered

The Warrant of Debt was served on

agent on August 18, 2000. Id.

Gardiner

obtained a judgment against Interport on January 3, 2001, in the
amount of $7,182.95, plus interest (at a rate of nine percent (9%)
per annum), and costs in the amount of $37.00 as of January 3,
2001.

Id.

at para. 2.

This Virginia judgment was filed as a

foreign judgment with the Millard County District Court on May 8,
2001.

Record, p. 1.
On August 28, 2000, 23 days after it received notice of the

pending lawsuit, Interport, by its President, William York, ("Mr.

-3-

York") transferred the only asset of any value it owned, the
warehouse, to his mother, Betty York ("York") and father Record, p.
217, para. 4. After the Conveyance, Interport continued to use the
warehouse for its own purposes and as its only place of business.
Id.

at para. 5.
Since Interport had conveyed the warehouse to York, Mr.

Gardiner was forced to file a petition for relief pursuant to the
Fraudulent Conveyance Act adding the Appellant as a party.

At

trial, York did not present any evidence that Interport owed her or
her husband any money.

Id.

at para. 10.

After the trial with

York, the Trial Court held that Interport's conveyance was a
fraudulent transfer. Record, p. 217, Order of the Court para. 1.
The Court allowed Mr. Gardiner to have a judgment lien on the
asset. Record, p. 217, Order of the Court para. 4.
ARGUMENT
STANDARD
The standard of review regarding this appeal is whether or not
the Trial Court's findings were "clearly erroneous." See, Jeffs
Stubbs,

supra,

v.

970 P.2d at 1240. Moreover, this Court reviews the

issue allowing "a trial court discretion in its application of the
law to a given fact situation."

Tolle

v. Fenley,

132 P.3d 63, 66

(Utah App. 2006) . As the following demonstrates, the Trial Court's
rulings were not clearly erroneous.
The Record Supports a Finding that the Conveyance
Violated the Fraudulent Conveyance Act
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After the trial with York, the Court held that Interport's
conveyance was a fraudulent transfer based upon two different
theories: one, that the conveyance "was made with the intent to
hinder, delay or defraud its creditor, [Mr. Gardiner]," Record, p.
217, Para. 1; and two, that the Interport

"did not receive

^reasonably equivalent value in exchange' for the warehouse causing
Interport to incur debt beyond its ability to pay."

Id.

at para.

3. Because of this ruling, the Court allowed Mr. Gardiner to have
a judgment lien on the warehouse Interport conveyed to York. Id. at
para. 4. The Appellant has now appealed the Trial Court's decision
arguing error in each of the alternate finding's that Interport
fraudulently conveyed the property. As the following demonstrates,
the Appellant's arguments are without merit and should be summarily
dismissed.
A) The trial court ruled that Interport "did not receive
^reasonably equivalent value in exchange' for the warehouse causing
Interport to incur debt beyond its ability to pay." Id.
para. 3.

Order at

York challenges the Trial Court's ruling arguing that

Utah Code Section 25-6-5 (1) (b) (ii) "refers to debt that would be
incurred subsequent to the transfer, not preceding it." Appellant
Brief (hereinafter "Brief") at 6.

As the following demonstrates,

the Appellant's argument is without merit and should be summarily
dismissed.
Utah Code § 25-6-5 (1) (b) (ii) states in pertinent part as

-5-

follows:
(1) A transfer made . . . by a debtor is fraudulent as to
a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or
after the transfer was made . . . , if the debtor made the
transfer . . .:
* * *

(b) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in
exchange for the transfer . . .; and the debtor:
-k

-k

-k

(ii) . . . believed or reasonably should have believed
that he would incur, debts beyond his ability to pay as
they became due.
Thus, Subsection
following

occurs:

1)

(b) (ii) "addresses situations where the
the

debtor

transfers

property

without

receiving equivalent value in the exchange; and 2) would incur
debts beyond the debtors ability to pay.
In short, York is not disputing that Interport did not receive
adequate value for the Conveyance only that Subsection (ii) "refers
to future debts." Id.

York supports her contention by arguing that

there "was no testimony or evidence whatsoever presented at trial
which showed that Interport was about to or intended to incur debts
beyond its ability to pay as they became due."
The Appellant

provides

no case

interpretation of the statute.

law to

Id.
support

such an

Clearly, the statute defines a

fraudulent transfer in situations where the debtor disposes (or
hides) assets to avoid debts that it has incurred, especially when
a judgment is eminent. The statute simply sets aside a conveyance

-6-

for less than value in exchange when the conveyance caused the
debtor to become insolvent. This is exactly the situation present
in this matter.

This Court should resist the Appellant's skewed

reading of the statute.
Even if this Court were to consider Appellant's contentions,
Interport incurred a debt after the conveyance beyond its ability
to pay.

The trial court found that Interport's registered agent

received notice of the Warrant in Debt by mail on or about August
5, 2000 and was served by personal process on or about August 18,
2000 Record, p. 217 Finding of Fact para. 1
warehouse occurred on August 28, 2000.

Id.

The transfer of the

at para. 5. On January

3, 2001, the Virginia Court entered judgment against Interport.
Clearly, these facts clearly establish the element of Section
(b)(ii) that Interport's conveyance caused it to incur debt beyond
its ability to pay.

Interport "reasonably should have believed"

that a judgment would result because of a Warrant in Debt action.
Interport

transferred

the

warehouse

(its

only

asset

of any

value)with full knowledge that it "would incur debts [a judgment]
beyond [its] ability to pay as they became due." The trial court's
conclusion that the transfer was fraudulent under Utah Code § 25-65(l)(b)(ii) must be sustained.

Its conclusion was not "clearly

erroneous."
B) The trial court ruled that the conveyance in question was
fraudulent because the conveyance was done with "actual intent" to
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hinder, delay or defraud as defined by Utah Code § 25-6-5(1)(a).
York argues that the Trial Court's finding was not "justified or
supported by anything placed in evidence."

Brief at 7.

As the

following demonstrates the Appellant's argument is without merit
and should be dismissed.
Utah

Code

25-6-5(2)

provides

that,

to

determine

"actual

intent" under Subsection (1) (a) , "consideration may be given, among
other factors, to whether"
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider;
(b) the debtor retained possession or control of the
property transferred after the transfer;
(c) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;
(d) before the transfer was made or obligation was
incurred, the debtor had been sued or threatened with suit;
(e) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets;
(f) the debtor absconded;
(g) the debtor removed or concealed assets;
(h) the value of the consideration received by the debtor
was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset
transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred;
(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly
after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred;
(j) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after
a substantial debt was incurred; and
(k) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the
business to a lienor who transferred the assets to an
insider of the debtor.
The trial court found that factors (a), (b), (d), (e) and (h)
demonstrating
question.

actual

Order

intent

Para.

2.

were
As

present

shown

in

below,

the
the

transfer
Trial

in

Court's

decision was correct and supported by the facts of the c a s e — i t was
not "clearly erroneous."
(a) The transfer or obligation was to an insider. York asserts
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that she and her husband were not "insiders" because there was no
evidence that they were officers or stockholders of Interport nor
did they "had any inside position . . . ."

Brief at 7.

Further,

York asserts that the "conclusion that the parents of a corporate
officer are insiders is unwarranted by case law or statute."

Id.

On the contrary, the statute expressly defines "insider" to
include "a relative of a general partner, director, officer, or
person in control of the debtor . . . ."

Utah Code § 25-6-

2(7) (b) (vii) . Thus, as a matter of law, York and her husband were
insiders.
(b) The debtor retained possession or control of the property
transferred after the transfer. York asserts that the testimony
presented at trial does not support a finding that the debtor
retained possession and control of the property.
quotes page

The Appellant

35 of the Trial Transcript where Mr. York, the

President of Interport, acknowledged that the warehouse in question
was still being used as storage for property belonging to Interport
(or

had

belonged

to

Interport).

Record

P.

272, p.35.

Furthermore, Mr. York, as the former president of Interport who had
made the transfer, was asked: "[Y]ou came here for a supplemental
hearing, correct, and I asked you some questions.
that?"

Id.

at p.35.

The witness responded "Yes."

Do you recall
Id.

He was

then asked: "I asked you if you had stuff in the warehouse, and you
said you still had some of your stuff in the warehouse, correct?"
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(Id.)

Id.

The witness, Mr. York, responded: "Yes."

Thus, there

was testimony supporting the trial court's finding that "Interport
through its president, Mr. York, retained control and use of the
warehouse." Record p.217, para. 2.

The Trial Court's ruling

was

not "clearly erroneous."
(d) Before the transfer was made, the debtor had been sued or
threatened with suit. The Trial Court concluded that Interport was
aware of the lawsuit filed by Mr. Gardiner prior to Interport's
conveyance of the warehouse to York.

York argues that such a

finding "requires a leap of faith." Brief at 8.

As the following

demonstrates, the Appellant's position is without merit and should
be summarily dismissed.
The testimony unequivocally stated that Gardiner mailed a copy
of the Warrant In Debt to Interport's registered agent on or about
August 2, 2000 and that the Complaint was served on the registered
agent on August 18, 2000.; Record p. 217, p. 17. This notice clearly
occurred prior to August 28 when the property was conveyed.
In Nevada, where Interport was incorporated,"'[s]ervice of
process'

is a formal

delivery

of documents

that

is legally

sufficient to charge the defendant with notice of a pending
action."

R.

Griggs

(D.Nev. 1996).

Ltd.

v. Filanto

Spa,

920 F.Supp. 1100

Thus, as a matter of law, Interport had notice of

the suit by August
significantly

Group

prior

5
to

(at the latest, August
Interport's
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August

18) which was

28th

conveyance.

Interport owned the property—not its President Mr. York.
York, as the President, conveyed the property.

Mr.

Mr. Gardiner was

not required, as the Appellant argues, to establish when Mr. York
became aware of the suit-only when Interport had notice.

Because

Interport had notice at least by August 18, that it was being sued.
Accordingly, the trial court's finding was not "clearly erroneous."
(e) The transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets:
The Trial Court found that the warehouse was Interport's only asset
of value.
ruling

was

York asserts that the only evidence supporting this
Gardiner's

testimony

Interport had was this warehouse."
at p. 20.

that

"the

only

assets

that

Record p.272 Trial Transcript

York argues that this testimony was "hearsay evidence

from an unqualified source . . . ."

Brief at 9.

The Trial Transcript reflects, however, that York did not
object to either the testimony nor its source and did not crossexamine Mr. Gardiner on this fact.

Thus, by "failing to object,

the defendants waived any objections . . . ." Gerard v. Young, 432
P.2d 343, 20 Utah 2d 30 ;(Utah, 1967).

See also Rule 103(a), Utah

Rules of Evidence:
Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits .
. . evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected, and . . . [i]n case the ruling is one admitting
evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears
of record . . . .
York never disputed or otherwise challenged this testimony.
This silence amounts to admission that the warehouse was the only
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asset. Accordingly, the trial court's finding that the warehouse
was the only asset of value was not "clearly erroneous/'1
(h) The value of the consideration received by the debtor was
not reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred.
The trial court found that "Mr. York's parents did not provide
value for the asset." (Record, p.217 para.2) York argues that this
finding is "clearly disproved by the evidence." Brief at 10. York
then supports her assertion by stating that "Mr. York in his
testimony repeated (sic) stated that money was owed to Senior York
and Mrs. York due to various business transactions." York cites to
testimony found on pages 30-31 of the trial transcript to support
her generalization.

Brief at 10. As the following demonstrates,

careful reading of the testimony on those pages, however, does not
support the Appellant's contentions.
Absent from the record and from the Appellant's Brief is any
testimony about the amount of the principle owed nor any evidence
regarding the status of the loan at the time the warehouse was
transferred. Indeed, on cross-examination, Mr. York was asked "you
have no idea what you owed your parents?" to which he responded:
"No, I have no idea . . . ." Record, p. 272, at p. 38. The trial
judge also asked Mr. York whether he had his parents "sign any

1

York also contends that there was there was no evidence of
whether there was "substantial cash in the bank or goods." Brief
at 10. Plainly, the finding that the warehouse was the only asset
of value logically means that there were no other assets of value,
such as cash or goods.
-12-

document indicating that the debt was paid off?" to which Mr. York
answered: "I don't recall that, no.

I don't believe so."

Id.

at

42.
When York herself testified, she offered Exhibit No. 6 which
purported to show the debt Interport owed to her and her husband.
Id.

at 43-44.

The trial court, however, observed that Exhibit No.

6 referred to "monies owed by Bill.
money is owed by the corporation."

They don't indicate that the
Id. 52.

Based on the above testimony, the Trial Court found that there
"is no evidence that the corporation owed monies to William and
Betty York."

Id.

at 52. Moreover, the court found that, even if

it interpreted Mr. York's testimony to support the contention that
Senior York loaned Interport $50,000 and that the loans reflected
in Exhibit No. 6 were to Interport,
the most the debt could be is around 70,000 - $69,000.
The evidence that the Court has been presented with is
that this - this particular property has an assessed
value by Millard County of around 130,000. Mr. York has
testified that he is trying to sell the property for
345,000. So the 70,000 debt would be substantially less
than what the actual value of the property is.
Id.

at 52.2
2

York argues that, while the warehouse "is valued at
$130,000 for purposes of taxation there is also testimony that the
property is white elephant" because it "has been on the market for
years and shows sign (sic) of moving." Brief at 11. York omits
the reasons the warehouse has been on the market for years and
shows no signs of moving. Mr. York has merely put a sign on it
(Trial Transcript at 34) and has not engaged a realtor {Id. at 35)
and, most critically, is attempting to sell the warehouse for
$360,000. Id. 35. Thus, the evidence does not support York's
-13-

Thus, the trial court's conclusion that Mr. York's parents did
not provide value for the asset was not clearly erroneous." 3
CONCLUSION
This court should affirm the Trial Court's ruling that the
conveyance in question was fraudulent as to Mr. Gardiner.

Mr.

Gardiner should be able to levy execution on the property.

Respectfully submitted,
Richard E. Gardiner
By counsel

James K. Slavens
P.O. Box 752
Fillmore, UT 84631
(435) 743-4225

assertion that the warehouse is a white elephant and York's
contention that transferring the warehouse "in exchange for a
$50,000 loan could easily be construed as an equivalent exchange"
is frivolous and cannot be supported from the record.
3

It is thus irrelevant whether the 2002 tax return shows
loans to Interport of $23,432 and $4,000 because, even assuming
that those were loans to Interport, those loans would, in the trial
court's words, "be substantially less than what the actual value of
(what) the property is."' Id. at 52.
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